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Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain. Fintan O’Toole. 
London: Apollo, UK, 2018. 217 pages. ISBN: 978–1789540987. Pb 
£11.99. 
Peter C. Grosvenor, Pacific Lutheran University, Washington 
There is a huge asymmetry of understanding between the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom: the Irish know much more about the British than the British even pretend to 
know about them, much as Canadians know so much more about their neighbors to the south 
than Americans care to know about Canadians. For obvious reasons, Irish interest in the UK has 
intensified since the British voted 52% to 48% to leave the European Union. The political and 
economic impact of Brexit would be greater in Ireland than in any other EU country, and the 
Irish have no alternative but to prepare for it, as Tony Connolly has detailed in his book Brexit 
and Ireland (2018).  
 
But another Irish observer, the journalist Fintan O’Toole, offers an Irish perspective on 
what he believes to be the dire consequences of Brexit for Britain itself. O’Toole is a columnist 
for The Irish Times and a social democratic commentator whose previous books include Ship of 
Fools (2010), about financial corruption and malpractice during Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger” years. In 
this new book, O’Toole presents Brexit as psychodrama – a conscious act of self–harm that has 
deep roots in a crisis of British or, more specifically, English national identity.  
 
National identities in the British Isles are deeply interrelated and symbiotic. O’Toole 
begins his analysis with an acknowledgment of the extent to which Irish identity has been 
formed in opposition to Britishness: 
 
The official Irish culture of my childhood and youth was one that defined Ireland 
as whatever England was not. England was Protestant; so Catholicism had to be 
the essence of Irish identity. England was industrial; so Ireland had to make a 
virtue of its underdeveloped and deindustrialized economy. England was urban; 
so Ireland had to create an image of itself that was exclusively rustic. The English 
were scientific rationalists; so we Irish had to be the mystical dreamers of dreams. 
They were Anglo-Saxons; we were Celts. They had a monarchy, so we had to 
have a republic. They developed a welfare state; so we relied on the tender 
mercies of charity.1 
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But he also acknowledges that the realities were always somewhat at odds with this 
official culture, as Irish people volunteered for service in the British armed forces or migrated to 
Britain for the health and educational benefits of its welfare state and for its greater social and 
sexual tolerance. O’Toole professes great affection for the British, and regrets that Brexit 
threatens to make Britain and Ireland formally more separate than ever by placing them on 
opposite sides of an EU border. But if O’Toole is writing against the grain, it has not stopped 
him from producing a scathing depiction of a country in torment, cut loose from the constraints 
of strategic or economic interest calculation, and hell bent upon a masochistic course of atavistic 
and hubristic folly.  
 
O’Toole’s argument is deeply indebted to four curiously different sources: Herbert 
Spencer’s The Principles of Psychology (1855), E.L. James’s Fifty Shades of Grey (2011), 
Stephanie Barczewski’s Heroic Failure and the British (2016), and Timothy Snyder’s The Road 
to Unfreedom (2018). For Spencer, self-pity “makes a sufferer wish to be alone with his grief, 
and makes him resist all distraction from it.” The source of this grief is “the contrast between his 
own worth as he estimates it and the treatment he has received.”2 In this sense, self–pity 
combines a high sense of superiority with a deep sense of grievance. This phenomenon is 
foundational to O’Toole’s understanding of Brexit.  
 
According to O’Toole, Britain’s sense of superiority is rooted in its rose–tinted imperial 
history and its mythologized account of its role in WWII. Its sense of grievance arises from the 
harsh realities of decolonization and from relative economic and military decline. The parallel 
economic success of Britain’s WWII enemies Germany, Japan, and Italy, along with that of 
France and the Benelux countries whom the British insist they rescued, adds insult to injury. 
Britain’s EU membership institutionalizes this sense of grievance. 
 
So why, then, did Britain join what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1973? From O’Toole’s perspective, superiority and grievance at that time still existed 
separately in the British national psyche, and it was the dubious achievement of the Brexiteers to 
combine them later. Three conditions made this possible. Firstly, there was the sense of national 
crisis imposed on the 1970s by severe industrial unrest, an escalation of violence in Northern 
Ireland, and the rise in support for nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales. Any sense that 
the EEC represented an opportunity for national renewal was subsumed beneath an air of general 
despondency.  
 
Secondly, there was a change in the British practice of scapegoating – the search for an 
identifiable group to be blamed for decline. O’Toole notes that the last anti-Semitic riots in 
Britain took place in 1947, the year before the docking of the Empire Windrush marked the 
beginning of high-volume Commonwealth immigration, and black people replaced Jews as the 
national scapegoat. But by the 1980s, the blatant racism that had characterized the 1960s and 
1970s was pushed out of political discourse, the media, and popular culture. Thereafter, though 
attempts to scapegoat ethnic minorities would never go away, they would be forced to become 
more oblique. As O’Toole puts it, “[t]he dogwhistle would replace the megaphone.”3 This 
inhibition of racial scapegoating created a vacancy which was filled by the EU. As the historian 
Richard Weight expressed it, “Brussels replaced Brixton as the whipping boy of British 
nationalists.”4  
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O’Toole’s third condition for Brexit is the failure of welfarism. The post-WWII 
construction of the welfare state was an ambitious and optimistic futurist project. Its promise that 
each generation would be better off, and more secure, than the one that went before it offered a 
distraction from the loss of empire and the self-pity that it could induce. But the cancellation of 
the welfare ethos in the age of Thatcherism, and its gradual bipartisan disassembly through 
marketization and privatization, deprived the British of a unifying vision of future prospects and 
allowed them to dwell increasingly on the losses of the past.  
 
Under these conditions, the British became receptive to the Brexiteers’ rendition of 
British self-pity. That rendition also drew on a fusion of two antagonistic forms of nationalism 
bequeathed to Britain by its imperial experience: an imperial nationalism that promises to 
extricate Britain from the restrictions of the European theatre and place it back on the world 
stage, and an anti-imperial nationalism that takes the form of an insurgency against the 
oppression of Brussels. The logic is that if Britain is not an empire then it must be a colony, and, 
if it is a colony, then it must rebel – hence the Leave campaign slogan “Take Back Control.”  
 
Using some lamentable and over-long extracts from E.L. James’s execrable Fifty Shades 
series of novels, O’Toole contends that “[t]he political erotics of imaginary domination and 
imaginary submission are the deep pulse of the Brexit psychodrama.”5 Switching to worthier 
literary terrain, he finds support for the contention that Britain indulges itself in fantasies of 
submission in the best-selling novels that have imagined a Nazi-occupied or controlled Britain 
after defeat in WWII, such as Len Deighton’s SS–GB (1978), Robert Harris’s Fatherland (1992), 
or C.J. Sansom’s Dominion (2012).  
 
O’Toole is right that, for many prominent Brexiteers, the EU serves as a proxy for the 
German domination depicted in those dystopias. Indeed, the EU is frequently presented as the 
latest in a long tradition of coercive attempts to unify Europe. According to the late Kenneth 
Minogue, a Euro-Skeptic political scientist, earlier attempts include “the medieval popes, 
Charlemagne, Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler.”6 The exact same sentiments were echoed by 
Boris Johnson during the 2016 referendum campaign.7 Viewed from this perspective, the Brexit 
campaign is nothing less than a resistance movement, though one facing, as O’Toole points out, 
a harder occupation to confront:  
 
At least the Nazis could have been, in Churchill’s great and galvanic rhetoric, 
fought on the beaches, hills, fields and streets. They offered the ‘chance to fight 
back’. The new German invasion, cloaked in the guise of peaceful co-operation, is 
more damnable because it does not give the English Resistance a proper physical 
target. Hostility to the EU thus opens the way to a bizarre logic in which a Nazi 
invasion would have been, relatively speaking, welcome.8 
 
The leaders of this self-styled resistance movement concede that Brexit – especially a 
“hard” Brexit, in which Britain leaves the EU without agreed terms – could entail considerable 
economic hardship in the short-to-medium term. Leading Conservative Brexiteer Jacob Rees-
Mogg MP has, for example, acknowledged that it could take up to fifty years to assess whether 
Brexit has been positive or negative in its economic impact.9 But this does not deter the 
resistance. To explain this, O’Toole turns to the work of Stephanie Barczewski (2016). 
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For Barczewski, “the highest form of English heroism is stoicism in the face of defeat,” 
and the commemoration and memorialization of heroic defeats and failures – the 1809 retreat 
from Corunna during the Peninsula War, Franklin’s lost expedition of 1845, the catastrophic 
Charge of the Light Brigade in 1854, the massacre at the hands of the Zulus at Isandlwana in 
1879, the death of General Gordon at Khartoum in 1885, the debacle of the Somme in 1916, the 
1940 evacuation of Dunkirk – are staple British cultural tropes.10  
 
In drawing on Barczewski, O’Toole’s point is that the prospect of post–Brexit hardships 
does not deter Brexit; rather, it converts Brexit into an opportunity to display the resilience in the 
face of hardship that the British believe to be an elemental part of their national character. In that 
sense, the release of Christopher Nolan’s film Dunkirk in the year of the EU referendum is a 
priceless coincidence.  
 
In the work of American historian Timothy Snyder, O’Toole finds further explanation for 
the apparent eagerness of many Leave voters to confront the queues and shortages that Brexit 
may entail: it is a form of what Snyder calls “sadopopulism” – a people’s willingness to inflict 
pain on themselves provided that, at the same time, it inflicts as much, or greater, pain on the 
enemy. This can be found in Brexit campaigners’ threats of a tourist boycott of Spanish beaches, 
or of the imposition of tariffs on German cars or Italian wine: it is acceptable to damage the UK 
economy in pursuit of Brexit, provided it damages the EU economy too.  
 
Heroic Failure presents Brexit as the existential scream of a Britain in the grip of a 
collective identity crisis. All nations are, in Benedict Anderson’s 1983 coinage, Imagined 
Communities, and, as Linda Colley (1992) has shown in Britons, Britishness was imagined in 
order to provide the state created by the 1707 Act of Union between England and Scotland – 
expanded to include Ireland in 1800 – with a corresponding national identity. It is well 
understood that the “Celtic” nationalisms of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have presented 
challenges to that English–dominated Britishness. But, for O’Toole, the principal challenge to 
British identity today comes from a distinctly English nationalism, the resurgence of which 
provides the energy that fuels Brexit.  
 
For centuries, English identity folded itself comfortably into two structures that were 
notionally British but in reality English-dominated: the empire and the Union. The empire, of 
course, is long gone. The Union still exists, but it underwent profound changes in the 1990s, with 
the Belfast Agreement in Northern Ireland in 1998, which provided for a revived Northern Irish 
Assembly, and with the creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999. As a 
consequence, the English, with no specifically English national political structures, began to 
withdraw mentally from the Union. As O’Toole points out, the heartlands of Brexit are to be 
found in non–metropolitan England. That this growth in English national consciousness went 
largely unnoticed – not least in metropolitan England, where politics, the media, and academia 
are located – is the principal reason why the Leave vote in 2016 came as such a surprise, even to 
leading Leave campaigners. 
 
That Brexit now poses an existential threat to the Union is acknowledged on both sides of 
the argument. In England, 54% of voters voted Leave, as did 52% of voters in Wales. By 
contrast, Remain won with 62% of the vote in Scotland and with 55.8% in Northern Ireland. As a 
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result, it is entirely possible that in the future some parts of what is now the UK will be inside the 
EU and others outside. In the Scottish independence referendum of 2014, the risk that an 
independent Scotland would not be admitted to the EU was a major part of the Unionist case. 
Today, the prospect that Scotland may be taken out of the EU even though it voted with a solid 
majority to stay is fueling demands for a second reformation on independence. In Wales, public 
opinion now trends majority Remain and support for independence, though still very low by 
Scottish standards, has edged marginally upwards. 
 
But it is on the island of Ireland that Brexit’s impact on the question of national identity 
within the UK is most intensely felt. The UK’s departure from the EU poses immense practical 
problems for Northern Ireland. Since the Good Friday peace agreement of 1999, there has been 
only the softest of soft borders between the province and the Republic of Ireland. The risk is that 
the border hardens as it becomes the only land boundary between the UK and the EU. This is the 
subject of the so-called “Irish backstop” that has caused the Brexit negotiations between London 
and Brussels to stall. Under the backstop, the border would be kept soft by the UK retaining all 
EU regulations and tariffs, thereby negating the purpose of Brexit. Alternatively, Northern 
Ireland could retain the EU rules as the rest of the UK casts them off, leading in effect to a 
border in the Irish sea between Northern Ireland and the mainland – a nightmare scenario for 
Unionists. The Irish republican party Sinn Fein has already issued calls for a “border poll” on 
Irish reunification in the event of Brexit taking place.  
 
Though O’Toole professes to feel Britain’s pain – which may become Ireland’s pain –
there is a detectable undercurrent of Schadenfreude in this book. This is especially apparent in 
his treatment of the Brexiteers’ adoption of the Irish Free State (IFS) as a model for Brexit 
Britain. At its creation, the IFS was subject to constraints imposed by the UK in terms of access 
to ports, oaths of supremacy, and residual fiscal obligations; however, over time, the IFS was 
able to erode these constraints in practice and to construct a genuine independence. For some 
leading Brexiteers, Britain could gradually erode away the constraints of any Brexit deal with the 
EU in the much same way. It is hard to begrudge O’Toole his sense of delicious irony as he 
watches Brexiteers – most of whom are staunch Unionists – adopt Éamon De Valera as a role 
model. O’Toole also has fun drawing parallels between the July 2016 Leave vote and the 1916 
Easter Rising – an Irish heroic failure.  
 
But O’Toole is also genuine in his lament for Britain, which he believes to be losing, 
rather than recovering, itself in the Brexit process. This can be seen in a further irony: Brexit’s 
importation of French political concepts that have, until now, been absent from, and antithetical 
to, the British political tradition. This can be seen in the constant evocation of “the will of the 
people” – a Rousseauean, French revolutionary term that implies that the 52% who voted Leave 
constitute “the people,” with no consideration given to the 48% who voted Remain. It can be 
seen too in the use of the term “enemies of the people” to describe critics of Brexit, as in the 
Daily Mail’s November 4, 2016 headline after three High Court justices ruled that the initiation 
of Brexit would require the approval of Parliament. In that sense, there is something very un-
British about this particular British revolution.  
 
Heroic Failure is a highly intelligent, often humorous, polemic, illustrated by a wide 
range of pop-cultural references. Anyone interested in the interplay of national identities in the 
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United Kingdom would do well to read it, though the utility of the book would have been greatly 
enhanced by the inclusion of an index. But O’Toole is too ready to let the Brexiteers represent 
the British as a whole – perhaps inadvertently conceding to them their highly questionable claim 
to speak for “the people.” And English readers might ask the familiar question about why Irish, 
Scottish, and Welsh nationalism are seen as progressive forces, whereas English nationalism is 
necessarily reactionary. 
 
There can be no doubt that Britain today is a deeply troubled place, as evidenced in the 
June 2019 survey by BritainThinks, which reveals a country that is deeply divided by region, by 
social class, and by age, and one that is increasingly contemptuous of its political institutions, 
that believes its future prospects to be bleak, and that considers itself to be an international 
laughing stock on account of Brexit.11 It is a picture of fatigue, lack of confidence, pessimism, 
and embarrassment, very much at odds with the bombast of the Brexiteers who appear 
throughout this book. But O’Toole’s core argument – that Brexit is best understood in terms of 
conflicting conceptions of identity in a post-imperial Britain in which the Union is loosening – is 
highly plausible. So, too, is his contention that Brexit will prove to be yet another heroic failure – 
whether Britain leaves the EU or not. 
 
Peter C. Grosvenor, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Sociology & Global Studies 
Pacific Lutheran University 
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